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ON THE ROAD TO ANGLO-SAXON CAPITALISM? GERMAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION BETWEEN MARKET 
AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 
Susanne Lütz and Dagmar Eberle ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether distinct national “varieties of capitalism” will survive in 
an increasingly globalizing economy has become one of the most 
hotly debated issues in Comparative Political Economy since the 
early 1990s. The internationalization of business and financial 
markets, the rise of institutional investors, the harmonization of 
legal rules in the context of the European single market project and 
the transformation of businesses practices and strategies pose 
significant challenges to national corporate governance regimes 
which are a core element of national political economies. Whereas 
the liberal model of capitalism and corporate governance is 
apparently better able to cope with these new challenges, their 
destabilizing effect on traditional institutions and practices seems 
to be particularly high in the coordinated market economies of 
continental Europe.  
In this paper, we explore the pressures for change and the 
responses in the case of German corporate governance regulation. 
Since the mid-1990s, the German corporate governance regime has 
experienced a series of statutory and self-regulatory reforms which 
reflect increasing pressure to move towards the market-oriented, 
Anglo-Saxon model. We explore to what extent the regulatory 
framework has been adapted to Anglo-Saxon norms and 
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institutional structures in different fields of corporate governance 
and what the driving forces and mechanisms of convergence were. 
While economic approaches narrowly confine corporate 
governance to the control of managers by shareholders, we prefer a 
more inclusive perspective. We define corporate governance 
regulation as the rules that shape the distribution of influence and 
control over company policy among different groups of 
stakeholders (Goyer 2001: 135; Streeck and Höpner 2003: 14). 
Corporate governance research usually distinguishes between 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms (cf. Mann 
2003: 78-98). The former operate via the institutional framework of 
the firm. Within the corporation, the board of directors constitutes 
the main device for monitoring management. External control is 
exercised by market forces and by outside actors. The main external 
control mechanism is the capital market in its function as market 
for corporate control. Located at the interface between internal and 
external corporate governance, between supplying information on 
the financial situation of a company to corporate insiders and to 
outside investors, is accounting (Baetge and Thiele 1998: 722; 
Schmidt and Tyrell 2005: 495-502).  The state shapes the structures 
and the functioning of the different governance mechanisms 
primarily through company law and capital market regulations. In 
the field of accounting, private standard-setters have traditionally 
played an important role in some jurisdictions. 
Following the “Varieties of Capitalism” typology, two ideal types 
of corporate governance regimes can be distinguished: market-
oriented “outsider” systems and network-oriented “insider” 
systems (Franks and Mayer 1995; Hall and Soskice 2001). They are 
characterized by systematic variances in the design and the 
importance of the different corporate governance mechanisms. In 
the “outsider” systems of Anglo-Saxon countries, share ownership 
is widely dispersed among a multitude of investors who generally 
have an arm’s length relationship with the firm and rarely 
intervene into its affairs. Market-based mechanisms of monitoring 
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and disciplining management serve to direct corporate strategy 
towards maximizing shareholder value. Company law tends to be 
more flexible and enabling while the internal organization of the 
company, especially the structure and composition of the board, is 
to a large extent perceived as a matter of private ordering and case 
law. The one-tier board is generally dominated by the top 
management, especially the CEO, who typically acts as chairman of 
the board (Cioffi 2003: 9; Donnelly et al. 2001: 11). Reporting rules in 
the Anglo-Saxon world are geared to the provision of information 
for the capital market. They provide for unbiased information 
about the success of a business, its state of affairs and its future 
prospects, usually reflected in the “true and fair view principle” 
(Nobes and Parker 2004: 22-23). Common Law systems rely on a 
limited amount of statute law which is then interpreted by the 
courts. Accounting rules in such a context are established as 
recommendations or standards by private accountants.  
German corporate governance used to be a prototype of the 
“insider” system. In this model, ownership concentration is 
generally high, and the relationships among firms are often 
characterized by cross-shareholdings and cross-directorates. Thus, 
firms are effectively shielded from hostile takeovers. As “patient 
capital” is provided by blockholders and long-term bank credits, 
the market valuation of the firm is less important for corporate 
policy. German company law lays down strict, mandatory rules 
which govern the internal structures and procedures of corporate 
decision-making. This comprehensive body of rules reflects not 
only Germany’s legalistic tradition, but also a pluralistic notion of 
the “interest of the corporation” which is understood to comprise 
the interests of shareholders as well as employees, creditors, 
suppliers, consumers and the general public (Hopt 1998). 
Correspondingly, internal governance provides stakeholder 
coalitions with institutionalized mechanisms of voice within the 
company to influence managerial decision-making. While the day-
to-day running of the company is assigned to the management 
board (Vorstand), the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) is responsible 
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for the appointment and monitoring of the management board and 
for approving certain business decisions. Board members typically 
represent major shareholders, financial and business partners of the 
company, and also labor. In coal, iron and steel companies with 
more than 1,000 employees, supervisory boards are organized on a 
model of paritary co-determination. With the Co-determination 
Law of 1976, this model was made mandatory for all companies 
with more than 2,000 employees (Hall and Soskice 2001: 23; 
Neubürger 2003: 179; Schmidt 2003: 9).   
Financial reporting rules are primarily focused on the protection of 
creditors’ interests by stabilizing the company and by providing 
the firm some autonomy in the composition of its annual account. 
The German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB) allows the 
company to take “hidden reserves” into account and to calculate 
gains and losses over longer periods (principle of prudence). 
Moreover, financial statements are also used to determine income 
and corporate tax. Due to this close linkage of tax assessment and 
financial reporting the state is equal to any other investor thereby 
turning into the “silent stakeholder” of the firm. Given that the 
German legal system has its origins in Roman law, its accounting 
rules are part of the code law system which means they can only be 
changed through legislation. Accordingly, decisions on accounting 
rules in Germany are viewed not only as a technical matter on 
which a group of accounting experts should be competent but the 
rule development process is coordinated by public actors, such as 
administrators in the Federal Ministries of Finance and Justice 
while only a relatively minor role is ascribed to the audit profession 
(Mc Leavy et al. 2004: 292-294).  
The debate in political economy offers two contrary propositions 
on the likely course of the reforms in German corporate governance 
regulation. The institutionalist approaches of Comparative Political 
Economy emphasize the stickiness of national institutional 
configurations. The most prominent theoretical framework 
predicting persistent diversity is the “varieties of capitalism” 
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approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). In this perspective, institutional 
complementarities and comparative advantages resulting from the 
specific national institutional arrangements create powerful 
incentives for national actors to respond to external pressures in 
path-dependant ways.  
In contrast, the International Political Economy literature observes 
the global diffusion of a neo-liberal version of market capitalism 
and regulation. This approach would lead us expect a much greater 
convergence towards a market-oriented “outsider” system. It sees 
the competition for the most mobile segments of capital as driving 
force for processes of convergence (e.g. Cerny 1997). IPE studies 
draw attention to transnational coalitions of political and economic 
actors, e.g. at the European level, who push for the liberalization of 
national markets (cf. van Apeldoorn 1999). Globally active private 
players are accorded an important role in the spread and 
harmonization of regulatory standards across national borders (cf. 
Cutler et al. 1999, Cutler 2003). 
Our paper traces the patterns and driving forces of change in two 
areas of corporate governance regulation, namely internal 
governance and accounting. In both cases, we observe a substantial 
transformation as regulation has been brought more into line with 
Anglo-Saxon norms and practices. Yet, the comparison of the two 
regulatory fields reveals significant differences in terms of the 
outcomes of transformation as well as the driving forces and 
mechanisms. In accounting, the structural power of Anglo-Saxon 
actors triggered a process of multilevel coordination leading to a 
high degree of convergence towards Anglo-Saxon standards and 
institutions of standard-setting. A much greater stability of the 
domestic institutional framework can be seen in the case of internal 
governance, where actors perceived market pressures to adapt 
regulatory standards to a moderate degree, but not the institutions 
of internal control. While the two strands of political economy offer 
important insights for analyzing these changes, both fail to account 
for the different patterns of convergence and divergence in the two 
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cases. Therefore, we argue that the political economy approaches 
have to be combined with a policy analysis perspective so as to 
capture the sectorally distinct interplay of national and 
transnational actors which was crucial for shaping the processes 
and the results of regulatory regime transformation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The following two sections analyze 
the national regulatory reforms in both fields against the backdrop 
of international developments. After comparing the transformation 
processes, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of the 
theoretical implications of our findings. 
II. INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
EMULATION TRIGGERED BY PERCEIVED MARKET 
PRESSURE 
In the post-war era, Germany’s constitutionalist and integrationist 
system of internal corporate governance was largely shielded from 
any pressures to move towards more market-oriented standards. 
This changed from the mid-1990s onwards, when state and private 
actors began to reassess the usefulness of the traditional corporate 
governance regime in light of the internationalization of financial 
markets and general concerns about the insufficient dynamics of 
the German economy (cf. Cioffi 2002). Since then, the regulatory 
framework for internal corporate governance has undergone a 
series of statutory and self-regulatory reforms, which brought a 
moderate degree of convergence to the Anglo-Saxon model. 
German regulation has moved towards Anglo-Saxon standards on 
transparency, (supervisory) board independence and accountability 
to all shareholders, although the German provisions on board 
independence are considerably less stringent than those applying 
in the US and the UK. The regulatory system which was 
traditionally based on mandatory company law has been 
supplemented by a self-regulatory “Code of Best Practice” modeled 
on the British example. However, Germany’s characteristic internal 
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governance structures – the two-tier board system and the co-
determination regime – have remained fairly stable so far. Hence, 
we find a mix of institutional stability and (limited) convergence on 
standards.   
The convergence on Anglo-Saxon standards was mainly driven by 
perceived market pressure emanating from the internationalizing 
capital markets and, in particular, the rising power of Anglo-Saxon 
institutional investors. The adaptation process was conducted by a 
national “modernization coalition” which included company law 
experts, government officials and globally oriented financial 
institutions and companies. Foreign institutional investors were, by 
and large, not directly involved in the national reform process and, 
until recently, have tended not to adopt a strong activist approach 
vis-à-vis German companies in terms of governance (Interviews 
D2, D29, D37). With the exception of one prominent representative, 
domestic institutional investors were largely inactive in the reform 
efforts, although some large German institutional investors have 
begun to emulate Anglo-Saxon investor activism (Handelsblatt, 5 
May 2004; Interviews D4, D21). The two national associations of 
private shareholders have been actively engaged in the debates, but 
they were too weak to propel reforms by themselves. The 
beneficiaries of the old insider model, the business community and 
labor unions, constituted the most important veto players, 
obstructing reforms which they saw as detrimental to their vital 
interests. The two-tier board structure has not been questioned by 
any player. 
The first phase of reforms was triggered in the mid-1990s by a 
proposal for a far-reaching company law reform drafted by 
Theodor Baums, a professor for company law, and Hans-Martin 
Bury, a young MP from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (Cioffi 
2002: 14-18). Against the backdrop of several spectacular cases of 
financial mismanagement at German companies (e.g. the cases of 
Metallgesellschaft, Balsam and the Schneider property 
development group), the governing CDU-CSU/FDP coalition 
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responded by developing a – more moderate – reform bill which 
was passed in 1998. Rather than severely curtailing the role of 
banks and corporate networks in internal corporate governance, as 
envisaged in SPD draft legislation, the so-called “Control and 
Transparency Act” (KonTraG) provided only for modest 
limitations on the power of these traditional “insiders”, although it 
introduced the principle of  “one share, one vote”. The law chiefly 
sought to increase the professionalism and the transparency of the 
supervisory board (Ziegler 2000: 203-206).   
The KonTraG represents the first step to move the German 
regulatory framework closer to the Anglo-Saxon outsider model. 
By improving transparency, accountability and efficiency of 
oversight, the drafters of the KonTraG sought to make the shares of 
German companies more attractive for domestic private investors 
and for foreign institutional investors whose growing importance 
was explicitly underlined (Interviews D11, D18, D21; Ziegler 2000: 
203-204).  However, the move towards a more capital market-
driven regime was to be achieved within the traditional 
institutional framework. The reformers saw no need to change to a 
one-tier board (Interview D 11). While no political force or interest 
group was willing to challenge the fundamentals of the co-
determination regime, the first draft of the KonTraG had proposed 
to reduce the size of the supervisory board (and thus the number of 
union representatives). This provision was removed after protests 
by the trade unions, social democrats and the trade union wing of 
the CDU (Cioffi 2002: 18-19; Handelsblatt, 22 April 1997). 
The passage of the KonTraG was facilitated by the changing 
strategic interests of large banks and of globally oriented German 
companies. The major private banks had already started to extract 
themselves from the close personal and capital ties of “Germany 
Inc.” as they were reorienting their business strategy from close 
lending relationships towards investment banking services. Large 
German companies were also increasing their financial autonomy 
from banks. From the mid-1990s onwards, more and more globally 
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oriented firms espoused shareholder value philosophies, a trend 
certainly reflecting the growing foreign investment in blue chip 
companies (Beyer and Höpner 2003; Lütz 2005). Due to these 
changes, bank and industry associations came to accept the broad 
lines of the government’s moderate reform bill, while opposing the 
more radical SPD proposal (Cioffi 2002: 17; Interview D21). 
In contrast to the KonTraG which originated in the political realm, 
the initiative for the second round of reforms, the formulation of a 
German corporate governance code, came from the private sector. 
The introduction of an official code for the German market in 2002 
can be seen as milestone for the convergence towards Anglo-Saxon 
standards on internal corporate governance, as the code explicitly 
emulated practices promoted by Anglo-Saxon investors in terms of 
form and content. While the KonTraG was also geared to national 
investors as its drafters sought to promote an equity culture in 
Germany, the code’s central target group were foreign institutional 
investors. 
A self-regulatory “code of best practice” which is to be enforced by 
market forces was first adopted in Great Britain in 1992. The 
Cadbury Code laid down a set of corporate governance 
recommendations for companies. While the provisions of the code 
were not mandatory, companies were required to state whether 
they complied with the rules and to explain any deviations. This 
concept was copied in many other markets. Most codes focus on 
questions of transparency and the role and responsibilities of the 
board, calling for boards to include a number of “independent” 
non-executive directors without close ties to top managers and/or 
the company so as to ensure effective and objective oversight 
(Cadbury 2000: 9-11). In the US, activist public and union pension 
funds who issued their own corporate governance guidelines 
began to urge companies to appoint a majority of independent 
directors in the 1990s (Monks and Minow 2004:167).   
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In Germany, two private ad-hoc commissions presented – more or 
less competing – corporate governance codes in 2000. The first 
group which included company law experts and industry leaders 
had been assembled by Christian Strenger, the former head of the 
investment fund DWS and public “figurehead” of the investor 
scene. Strenger saw corporate governance guidelines not only as 
necessary to prevent undesirable developments in companies. He 
argued that the lack of a set of internationally acceptable principles 
which would allow investors to systematically evaluate the 
practices of individual companies put German companies at a 
disadvantage in the international financial markets (Schneider and 
Strenger 2000: 106-109). Like Strenger, a number of global players 
in German finance and industry had become concerned that 
international investors perceived Germany as a “developing 
country” in terms of corporate governance and were therefore 
suspicious of the German market (Interviews D6, D31). Foreign 
investors, most prominently CalPERS, had called for a German 
code (CalPERS 1998). In line with international examples, the code 
developed by the Strenger group emphasized the oversight 
function of the (supervisory) board. The second code, which was 
drafted by a group of company directors and consultants around 
Axel von Werder, an economics professor, centered more on the 
management board (Berliner Initiativkreis German Code of 
Corporate Governance 2000). 
German companies perceived the existence of two codes as 
problematic (Interviews D 24, D 30). In this situation, the 
government stepped in and eventually took on the task to 
coordinate the code formulation. Spurred into action by the near-
collapse of Philipp Holzmann, a leading German building 
company, the new SPD-Green government put Baums in charge of 
a government commission which was to review the German 
regulatory framework in terms of terms of potential weaknesses 
and the expectations of the international capital markets 
(Interviews D16, D21, D26). The so-called Baums Commission 
which comprised representatives of all stakeholders strongly 
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endorsed the idea of a formal German code. Following its 
recommendations, the government set up a standing commission 
which drew up a comprehensive code. The industry and its 
association, the BDI, had warmed to the introduction of a code as it 
was made clear that the code would not be purely regulatory, but 
that a major function of this instrument would be to explain the 
existing legal framework to foreign investors (Interview D21). 
German experts and market players felt that the bad international 
reputation of the German regime stemmed to a significant extent 
from the lack of knowledge about the German two-tier system and 
its peculiarities (Interviews D2, D6). 
The code sought to address the main criticisms voiced by Anglo-
Saxon investors, inter alia by promoting transparency of the 
company and its governance and by introducing independence 
provisions for the supervisory board (Cromme 2001). However, the 
code did not give a general definition of independence. It 
recommended that supervisory board members should not hold 
parallel board mandates in competitor firms, that no more than two 
of the members should be former members of the management 
board of the respective company and that the audit committee 
should not be chaired by a former executive. Also, supervisory 
board members were advised to disclose conflicts of interest which 
may result from an affiliation with lenders or other business 
partners of the company. In the case of material and permanent 
conflicts of interest, the respective board member should terminate 
his mandate. Compared to Anglo-Saxon standards, the code 
applied a rather cautious and selective approach towards 
independence (Hopt and Leyens 2004: 7).    
In effect, the code stopped short of fundamentally challenging the 
position of traditional “insiders” in the board who represent large 
shareholders and business relationships, which had been decried 
by foreign investors (CalPERS 1998). This reflects mainly the strong 
position of company representatives in the multi-stakeholder code 
commission. Furthermore, reformers like Strenger pursued a 
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relatively moderate, incrementalist approach. However, there are 
also structural constraints, as paritary co-determination hinders far-
reaching independence requirements (Interviews D2, D30, D31; 
Strenger 2001: 59-60). 
Not surprisingly, subsequent initiatives to achieve tighter rules in 
sensitive areas proved to be controversial. In 2003, the code 
commission had, under pressure from shareholder representatives 
and the government, introduced a rule prescribing individualized 
disclosure of managers’ pay (Handelsblatt, 22 May 2003) Yet, 
compliance with this rule remained sketchy, so that the 
government took legislative action in 2005 (Interview D26). In the 
same year, the issue of board independence was once more put on 
the agenda of the code commission by the EU Commission which 
had, in the previous year, issued a recommendation aimed at 
strengthening the role of independent directors (European 
Commission 2005; Interview EU8). While the final recommendation 
was considerably softened due to protests from industry and some 
member states, and its far-reaching independence requirements 
were shifted to an annex, its full implementation would have meant 
significant changes to the German code. But the code commission 
used the latitude provided by the text of the recommendation and 
its non-binding character and opted for a minimalist interpretation. 
The code commission followed the broad lines of the EU 
recommendation by calling for “an adequate number” of 
independent supervisory board members and by adopting a 
general definition of independence as “no business or personal 
relations with the company or its management”. But, unlike the EU 
proposal, this definition left out relations to a controlling 
shareholder (Spindler 2005). Moreover, it was decided not to adopt 
a set of detailed independence criteria as outlined in the EU 
recommendation’s annex. Business representatives in the 
commission stated, for once, that the code already addressed the 
problem in its sections on conflicts of interest. Also, it was felt that 
the advantages of the traditional function of the supervisory board 
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as “relationship board” (Hopt 1998: 234) should not be easily 
disregarded. A formalistic approach towards independence would 
mean that the knowledge brought to the board by a client or 
supplier would be lost. More generally, commission members 
argued that the stringent and formalistic Anglo-Saxon 
independence standards respond to specific problems of one-tier 
boards, whereas a two-tier board model already provides for 
certain checks and balances (Interviews D6, D31, D32). Another 
controversial aspect which the EU recommendation sought to 
restrict was the practice of appointing an outgoing CEO as 
supervisory board chairman. This had become more and more 
common in Germany, but was strongly criticized by domestic 
private and institutional investors. The confluence of these 
influences prompted the code commission to introduce a provision 
that it should not be the rule for former top executives to become 
chair of the supervisory board (Interview D 20).   
Besides the code, the German regulatory framework saw further 
legislative changes. This third round of reforms also goes back to 
recommendations of the Baums Commission. Under the impression 
of recent scandals in Germany, the Baums Commission had 
advised to move the liability regime closer to the Anglo-Saxon 
model in terms of scope and enforcement of shareholders’ claims 
(Regierungskommission Corporate Governance 2001). A 
comprehensive and effective liability regime was perceived to be a 
constitutive element of a developed capital market. Thus, by 
tightening the rules for the liability of directors, the government 
sought to strengthen the confidence of all investors in the German 
market and to further the global “marketing” of the German system 
(BMF 2004; Interviews D21, D24, D29). Most of the proposed 
changes were implemented by two laws passed in 2005. As these 
bills also addressed concerns of the business community, they were 
not very controversial. However, the most significant reform bill 
which would have made board members personally liable for false 
and misleading information to the capital market, met with fierce 
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resistance by the business community and was withdrawn by the 
government (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 January 2005). 
Although the Baums Commission had been given a very broad 
mandate, Baums and the government had agreed to keep the issue 
of co-determination out of the discussion, because it was too 
divisive. But the co-determination regime is coming under pressure 
by initiatives of the EU to facilitate corporate restructuring and 
mobility within the common market. Whereas the EU Commission, 
due to the different varieties of capitalism, had been unable to 
substantially harmonize company law in the EU, in recent years, it 
achieved the passage of the European Company Statute and the 
Directive on cross-border mergers (Donnelly 2005: 2-4; Rhodes and 
van Apeldoorn 1998: 422-424). These measures and several rulings 
by the European Court of Justice will fuel open competition 
between national legal forms. While the German industry had long 
acquiesced to the co-determination regime, these developments 
have prompted its large associations to mount a campaign to 
restrict co-determination (BDA and BDI 2004). Although the 
incumbent SPD-Green government rejected any fundamental 
changes, it accepted the need to make the co-determination regime 
“fit” for the new European context and appointed a corporatist 
commission to develop a reform concept. But when this 
commission finished its work at the end of 2006, it was unable to 
produce a consensual report, as business and trade union 
representatives could not agree (Handelsblatt, 20 December 2006). 
However, it remains to be seen how long the trade unions and their 
allies in the SPD and the trade union wing of the Conservatives will 
be able to resist change. 
Further changes in the German corporate governance regime may 
also lie ahead due to recent developments in investor activism. 
There are signs that foreign institutional investors are intervening 
more forcefully in the governance of German companies. While 
activist Anglo-Saxon investors have engaged in a dialogue with the 
management and have also handed over their corporate 
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governance principles to companies, they have generally refrained 
from using the same aggressive tactics to shake up companies as in 
their home markets (Interview D2). However, the events at 
Deutsche Börse in 2005 where rebellious investors led by hedge 
funds ousted both the CEO and the chairman of the supervisory 
board may signal a watershed (Interview D29). Recent protests by 
Anglo-Saxon – and German – institutional investors against 
problematic corporate governance arrangements at VW and 
ThyssenKrupp also seem to indicate that the pressure on German 
companies is becoming more intense (Financial Times, 2 May 2006, 
20 January 2007; Interview D 37). 
III. ACCOUNTING: ANGLO-SAXON HEGEMONY 
AND MULTILEVEL COORDINATION 
The German accounting model has to a large extent converged on 
international financial reporting standards and Anglo-Saxon 
institutions of standard-setting. In accounting, there has been a 
movement towards Anglo-Saxon norms of disclosure and investor 
protection in financial reporting. In 1998, Germany adopted 
legislation that allowed listed firms to depart from the German 
commercial code (HGB) and to prepare their consolidated accounts 
in accordance with U.S. GAAP and the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). From the continental 
European viewpoint, IFRS is a body of accounting rules firmly 
rooted in the Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition, by emphasizing 
the purpose to give useful information to various users (mostly 
investors) in order to improve their financial decisions. The overall 
objective is to give a fair presentation of the state of affairs and 
performance of a business (“true and fair view principle”), so that 
users of financial statements can make good decisions (Nobes and 
Parker 2004: 111-112).  
The development of accounting standards used to be coordinated 
by public actors while only a minor role was ascribed to the audit 
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profession. Since 1998, however, accounting standards are set by 
the German Accounting Standards Committee (Deutsches 
Rechnungslegungs Standards Komitee, DRSC), a private sector 
institution. The committee was mandated to advise the Ministry of 
Justice on changes to accounting law, to adapt German accounting 
principles to international norms by 2004, and to represent 
Germany in international standard-setting fora (Ernst 1999: 346-
347). The DRSC was modeled on the U.S. standard-setter FASB, in 
instigating due process for the development of its standards and in 
being staffed with independent experts – three from industry, two 
auditors, one financial analyst and one academic (Mc Leavy et al. 
2004: 312-315).  
How can we explain this substantial degree of convergence on the 
Anglo-Saxon model? In general, we argue that the regulatory 
transformation here was triggered by the “structural power” 
(Strange 1994, 1996) of Anglo-Saxon actors in general and the U.S. 
in particular. Power came about in forms of expert-, market- and 
political pressure which, by triggering further coordination 
activities in the European Union, left German actors not much 
leeway for institutional entrepreneurship. In fact, it was a highly 
internationalized network of actors, comprising large German 
companies, large audit networks, U.S. regulators and the European 
Commission, pushing for a reorganization under Anglo-Saxon 
auspices, while being confronted with domestic opposition.  
Until the mid-1990s, pressures to adapt German accounting rules 
and institutions to Anglo-Saxon standards were relatively low, 
given that the European capital market was not far developed and 
efforts of European harmonization remained relatively stuck. The 
4th Company Law Directive (1978) and the 7th Directive on 
Consolidated Accounts (1983) compromised between conflicting 
interests and accounting views of the Anglo-Saxon and continental 
European tradition by incorporation of a considerable number of 
optional treatments; the resulting vagueness (e.g. various 
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interpretations of the true and fair view principle) led to diversity 
in the process of national implementation.  
In the meantime, Anglo-Saxon standard-setters began to structure 
the field and to shift their national model of setting accounting 
standards by private professionals on to the global level. The UK 
sought to keep as much freedom as possible from the European 
harmonization process through cooperation with “leading” Anglo-
Saxon standard setters within the so-called Group of 4 (comprising 
the UK, Canada, U.S., Australia/New Zealand). The Study Group 
consisted of high profile practitioners from international 
accounting firms, centered around Sir Henry Benson from the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales. The aim 
of the group was to strengthen private standard-setting as an 
alternative to EU regulation in order to open up new markets for 
Anglo-Saxon auditing firms in continental Europe. The Study 
Group was the nucleus of an international private regime of 
standard setters, constituted in 1973 as International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC). The IASC brought together a small 
community of private experts from different national backgrounds 
that became wanderers between the Anglo-Saxon and continental 
European accounting worlds (e.g. Germany, France, Netherlands). 
Many of them had worked at the five or six leading auditing 
companies from the UK or the US that dominate the industry 
(among them KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst&Young and 
Deloitte and Touche). The IASC enhanced its legitimacy by 
establishing contacts with national regulators of securities markets 
like the American Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
and entered collaboration with the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) with the aim to establish the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) as a recognized set of 
standards for company access to stock exchanges. By transforming 
the IASC into the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
in 2001, a full-time independent standard-setter was established. 
The parallels between the structure of the IASB and the 
organization structure of the American standard-setter FASB, but 
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also the disproportionately high number of Anglo-Saxon members 
in the Board and in its Financial Reporting Interpretations 
Committee (IFRIC) (eight of 12 in 2006) have provoked criticisms of 
it for being too attentive to US interests, to the interests of the “Big 
Four” global accounting firms and to Anglo-Saxon accounting 
philosophy in general. But despite its active participation in the 
IASB, the U.S. still does not accept IASC standards as acceptable 
alternative to their national accounting rules because they view 
U.S.GAAP as superior in terms of coherence and legitimacy. 
Moreover, the IFRS reflect the UK’s “principle-based approach” of 
rule making that directs the focus on reporting the substance of 
economic events whereas the American “rule-based approach” 
puts more emphasis on detailed rules following the “letter of the 
law” (Botzem and Quack 2006; Dewing and Russell 2004a, 2004b; 
Mattli and Büthe 2005; Porter 2004). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Germany became confronted with 
the reluctance of the U.S. to accept international accounting 
standards as a ticket to the American capital market. Since the mid-
1980s, international equity markets grew, and particularly, U.S. 
stock exchanges became central for global capital flows and 
attractive for companies from other countries. In 1993, Daimler-
Benz seeking to be listed at the NYSE, faced the difficulty that the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did not consider 
financial statements, produced on the basis of the EU accounting 
directives or on the basis of national legislation, as acceptable. In 
practice, many global players such as Deutsche Telekom, Hoechst, 
SAP, Veba or SGL Carbon were asked to prepare a second set of 
financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP.  
This move of global players to leave the domestic camp did not 
only reflect the market power of American regulators, but in turn 
led to an overhaul of the EU Commission’s strategy to harmonize 
accounting standards. In the view of the European Commission, it 
was not acceptable that EU firms had to adopt a standard of 
another jurisdiction to get access to international capital markets. In 
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November 1995, after lengthy discussions with member states and 
interested parties the Commission published a Communication 
(COM 95 (508) in which it suggested to refrain from further efforts 
of harmonizing accounting standards for consolidated accounts 
and to put instead its weight behind the international 
harmonization process already under way in the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Global players should be 
allowed to prepare only one set of financial statements, preferably 
in accordance with IAS (van Hulle 2004: 355-357). A new impetus 
came with the Financial Services Action Plan of 1999, which 
contained some forty measures, the implementation of which 
should contribute to the realization of the integrated market for 
financial services in the EU. In the area of financial reporting, the 
Action Plan proposed that all listed EU companies report under the 
same accounting framework and had to prepare their consolidated 
accounts in accordance with IAS at the latest from 2005 onward. 
With approval of the European Parliament and the European 
Council the Commission issued a Regulation on the application of 
IAS in June 2002 (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002) which was 
directly applicable in all member states. The new standards are 
endorsed by the EU Commission on the basis of a comitology 
procedure. The Commission is assisted by the Accounting 
Regulatory Committee (ARC) comprising member states’ 
representatives and further observers, and by a private sector 
working group, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG) that should advise the ARC and contribute to the work of 
the IASB. A new standard is endorsed if a majority of member 
states in the ARC is in favor of the proposal, and, once the opinion 
of the European Parliament is known, the Commission formally 
issues the appropriate Regulation. Due to a constitutional reform of 
the comitology system in 2006 however, the European Parliament 
now may object to the adoption of a standard proposal even if the 
Commission intends to adopt it (Christiansen and Vaccari 2006; 
Dewing and Russell 2004a, 2004b). Thus, triggered by U.S. market 
power and by political pressure of American regulators, a 
multilevel framework for the endorsement of accounting standards 
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has been set up in the EU which was also meant to provide for 
proper representation of “European interests” in the private regime 
of accounting experts. 
Germany adapted the domestic institutions of setting accounting 
standards to the new private multilevel framework, but the 
transformation was contested by the political and economic forces 
involved. Global companies on the one hand pushed policy makers 
to proceed swiftly with legislation allowing them to depart from 
the German Commercial Code (HGB). They were interested in 
saving financial reporting costs by preparing their consolidated 
accounts according to U.S.GAAP or IAS only. Smaller and mid-
sized firms on the other hand defended the HGB and anticipated 
further pressures on non-listed firms to prepare their annual 
accounts based on IAS as well. Policy makers of different parties 
were concerned with the loss of national sovereignty through 
handing over the task of setting accounting standards for listed 
firms to a private body that was largely self-controlled. Doing so 
would not conform to the German tradition of making accounting 
standards through parliamentary legislation. Moreover, it was not 
foreseeable if there would be a possible linkage of the commercial 
account based on U.S.GAAP or IAS and the tax account and its 
implication for the public tax base – would the state still be able to 
calculate its revenue? (Interviews D 11, D 18, D 23). 
Meanwhile, concerns about the representation of continental 
European interests in the private multilevel framework have 
intensified. In May 2005 the Justice Committee of German 
parliament organized a public hearing to explore further options to 
politically influence the standard setting process which was 
considered as intransparent, complex and too speedy to keep up 
with. The IASB is seen to reflect the view of auditors trained in 
Anglo-Saxon accounting philosophy while showing lacking 
openness to complaints of users and preparers of financial reports, 
and to the perspective of small and mid-sized firms in particular. 
Proposals of European commentators (such as UNICE and EFRAG) 
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to change the constitution of the International Accounting 
Standards Foundation (IASCF) in a way to give those parties 
additional weight that have already adopted or are heading for 
adoption of IFRS/IAS have not been followed yet (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2005: 102; 188-189).  
Further criticism centers on the European endorsement process of 
standards issued by the IASB. The European Commission has 
endorsed virtually all international accounting standards with the 
exception of IAS 39 that was endorsed after a lengthy debate and 
discussion subject to “two carve outs”. The EC’s decision reflected 
intense lobbying by French and German banks, and even the 
intervention of President Chirac on this matter. A German Member 
of the conservative EPP-ED fraction in the European Parliament has 
announced that, from 2007 onward, the EP would not hesitate to 
veto the adoption of IFRS standards submitted to it even after a 
positive opinion from the comitology and the Commission. The 
IASB should be put under pressure to open its decision making 
process up to the political arena in general and to European 
interests in particular (Interview EU 16). So far, the IASB defines its 
independence as overruling principle allowing to shield the private 
and technically defined standard setting process against any effort 
of political intervention (Interviews D7, D 24). 
Large companies, auditors, but also EFRAG representatives see the 
international harmonization process in danger if the endorsement 
process should produce a European version of IFRS not accepted 
by the rest of the world. In order to avoid the creation of a 
“European GAAP”, EFRAG considers the non-endorsement of 
standards and interpretations as “last resort only” and 
recommends a pro-active European role on the global level which, 
given the distribution of power within the IASB, is practically 
difficult (Deutscher Bundestag 2005: 90-96). 
Recent struggles center around the latest IASB project to develop a 
“light version” of IFRS suiting the needs of SMEs. Smaller 
22 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 03 
 
companies and German industry associations contest the draft 
version of the “SMEs Pervasive Principles” submitted in February 
2007 because of their complexity and lacking necessity in general. 
In Germany and also in France the main business model has been 
the private, not listed, often family-owned company, traditionally 
not considered accountable to a wider public of investors. Given 
that the IFRS framework primarily suits the needs of firms seeking 
capital on international capital markets, the German Mittelstand is 
concerned of growing reporting costs and unknown implications 
for the companies’ own capital base (Handelsblatt, 2 and 7 
February 2006; 19 February 2007). The European Commission will 
not require mandatory application of the SME standard, but leaves 
the decision to the member states. Nevertheless, larger and more 
internationalized firms in general (with a turnover of more than 60 
mio. Euro per year) and especially subsidiaries of international 
groups feel increasingly under market pressure by their 
headquarters, rating agencies, foreign money lenders such as banks 
or private equity firms to speak an “international language” and to 
report based on IFRS (DIHK and PWC 2005: 5; 22; Conference 
Minutes 2006).  
IV. COMPARISON  
The German model of corporate governance regulation is 
undergoing substantial transformation in the two regulatory fields 
studied here. Both cases display a certain amount of convergence 
on Anglo-Saxon standards with the case of internal governance 
signifying much more stability of the domestic institutional 
framework than the field of accounting. By analyzing our cases in 
more detail however, we find substantial differences with regard to 
the outcomes of transformation and the driving forces and 
mechanisms behind them. 
The German regulatory framework governing internal corporate 
governance has moved towards the Anglo-Saxon model in terms of 
standards and regulatory instruments, but not with regard to the 
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institutional structure. Internal governance still operates on the 
basis of a two-tier board system with paritary co-determination for 
large companies. Following Anglo-Saxon examples, self-regulation 
via a code of conduct now plays an important role in setting the 
standards governing corporate behavior. Yet, soft law is still not as 
prominent as in the Anglo-Saxon world due to the strict statutory 
framework which has not been deregulated.  
While the first initiative in the mid-1990s has come from the 
political sector, the regulatory reforms have really been driven by a 
domestic “modernization coalition” comprising the government, 
global players in finance and industry, company law experts and 
the public “figurehead” of German institutional investors. The 
internationalization of financial markets coupled with general 
concerns about the competitiveness of German companies 
prompted state and private actors to reassess the traditional 
corporate governance regime (cf. Cioffi 2002). As the significance of 
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors and of their expectations in 
terms of best practice standards increased, the German 
modernizers felt under pressure to adhere more closely to the 
concepts espoused by these players. However, foreign investor 
pressure operated in an indirect fashion, as these investors, by and 
large, did not participate directly in the national reforms. Their 
expectations and interests were transmitted into the national 
reform arena mainly by domestic actors. Domestic investors were 
too weak to push through reforms by themselves. However, the 
adaptation to Anglo-Saxon standards proceeded only so far, as the 
position of traditional corporate insiders was not fundamentally 
challenged. The business community and the trade unions strongly 
opposed regulatory changes that would have considerably 
impaired their interests. 
Consequently, market forces emanating from the international 
capital markets were the dominant mechanism driving regulatory 
convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon model. The adoption of 
Anglo-Saxon reform concepts proceeded by way of policy 
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emulation (cf. Rose 1993). Thus, domestic reformers looked to the 
British code, the French best practice recommendations and to 
statements from international organizations which were colored by 
Anglo-Saxon patterns of thought as sources of inspiration in 
writing the German code. Vertical mechanisms operating through 
direct political power exercised by the US or EU harmonization 
efforts did not play a large role. EU multilevel governance is weak 
in this field, as the European Commission resorts to instruments of 
soft law which give national actors broad latitude. EU pressure on 
national regimes results chiefly from negative, not from positive 
integration. 
Compared with the case of internal governance, the German 
accounting model has been completely overhauled in response to 
Anglo-Saxon power. On the firm side, the segment of globally 
oriented preparers of accounts and of auditors (Big Four) has 
converged on Anglo-Saxon financial reporting standards and has 
accepted related requirements to regulate accounting business. A 
“public interest model” of setting accounting standards has been 
adopted reflecting Anglo-Saxon efforts to distance standard setting 
bodies from the accountancy profession. Moreover, accounting 
standards are now set by private actors, a development considered 
painful by German politicians and small and mid-sized firms. 
While global players decouple from old practices of insider 
monitoring and reporting, smaller and mid-sized firms still grapple 
with the costs that spillovers of rules made for the top tier of large 
firms may impose on them. To that extent the study exemplifies the 
fissures of the national model of corporate capitalism resulting from 
worldwide developments that have been studied elsewhere (Lütz 
2000, 2005).  
None of these changes would have happened without the 
structural power (Strange 1994, 1996) of Anglo-Saxon actors and of 
the United States in particular. Anglo-Saxon expert power was 
crucial in order to shift the model of private standard setting on to 
the global arena thereby preventing both legislators and lobby 
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groups from effective intervention. Power based on expertise links 
up with market power to the extent that the Big Four accounting 
firms and virtually all other medium sized accounting companies 
with international practice have strong Anglo-American origins 
and dominate the market for listed firms. The implication is that 
Anglo-Saxon accounting practice is commonly regarded without 
question as “best practice” thus achieving hegemony without 
having to try very hard (Dewing/Russell 2004a: 24). Moreover, 
given the attractiveness of the American capital market for foreign 
companies, US regulators could easily turn domestic market power 
into political power, by requiring compliance with US accounting 
standards in order to get listed at the NYSE. 
The picture would be incomplete, however, without taking the role 
of the European Union into account. The EU has stepped up her 
coordination efforts in response to European companies using the 
exit option and adopting US GAAP, and to US pressures to impose 
national law and regulation to European companies. Meanwhile, 
the EU has set up a multilevel comitology framework to provide 
input to private standard setting processes within the IASB. To that 
extent it is not only due to American hegemony, but also to 
intensified coordination within the EU that national actors are more 
restricted than ever to shape the rules and structures of the 
accounting world autonomously. It remains an open question to 
what extent the potential losers of this process will find a channel 
for interest representation in this multilevel framework. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, our analysis of the changes in German corporate 
governance regulation shows that sectoral differences matter. Our 
findings contradict the predictions of International Political 
Economy as well as of Comparative Political Economy, as we see 
neither a uniform trend towards convergence nor highly path-
dependant processes of change in the two fields studied here. Both 
approaches provide important insights for studying the 
transformation processes. Applying the perspective of International 
Political Economy allows us to trace the transnational forces that 
triggered convergence in the area of internal governance and in 
accounting. Moreover, this approach has a high explanatory power 
for the field of accounting where harmonization efforts were not 
only prompted by transnational actors, but also directly 
coordinated within an international multilevel system. As the 
confluence of Anglo-Saxon hegemony and legislative activities by 
the EU left national decision-makers with relatively little leeway, 
the transnational focus of International Political Economy captures, 
to a large extent, the dynamics of the transformation process and its 
outcome. 
However, the limits of the International Political Economy 
approach are obvious in cases of partial adaptation, as it is largely 
insensitive to national institutional configurations which still create 
powerful restrictions and opportunity structures for national 
actors. These national factors filtered and moderated transnational 
influences in the field of internal governance regulation, where 
national actors had greater latitude in devising their reform 
strategies. The Varieties of Capitalism perspective is certainly 
helpful for identifying such fault lines in externally induced 
processes of adaptation. The fact that until recently neither political 
actors nor corporations were willing to initiate a reform of the 
codetermination regime points to the staying power of institutions 
deeply rooted in the national political economy. Yet, an approach 
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focusing on the comparative advantages stemming from traditional 
institutional arrangements can hardly explain the deliberate 
insertion of market-oriented norms of transparency and 
shareholder accountability into the regulatory framework 
governing internal corporate structures. 
Both political economy approaches fail to account for the 
substantial variance between our two cases. Our analysis leads us 
to conclude that the sectorally distinct interplay of national and 
transnational actors was the crucial factor shaping the processes 
and the outcome of regulatory regime transformation. Evidently, 
political coordination within a framework of multilevel governance 
turned out to be a more potent mechanism for convergence than 
market-driven emulation at the national level. Different actor 
constellations made for different regulatory arenas. In the case of 
accounting, the US imposed its standards and regulatory 
requirements on foreign private issuers, thus coupling market 
power with direct political pressure. This helped the European 
Commission to overcome the political conflicts engendered by the 
national varieties of capitalism and thus to effectively harmonize 
standards and oversight structures. In contrast, US regulators did 
not require foreign companies seeking access to their capital 
markets to comply with the Corporate Governance Listing 
Standards of the NYSE and the NASDAQ which stipulate 
independence requirements for boards. This different approach 
may stem from the traditional emphasis placed on financial 
disclosure to protect shareholders’ interests and the limited 
jurisdiction of the SEC in the field of internal governance. The 
European Commission resorted to soft law in this area. In effect, 
decision-making was left primarily to national actors. 
Consequently, we need to link the political economy perspectives 
to a policy analysis approach in order to grasp the specific interplay 
of markets, actor constellations and institutional arenas in different 
fields of corporate governance regulation. 
2007] ON THE ROAD TO ANGLO-SAXON CAPITALISM? 29 
 
NOTES 
1 This paper presents preliminary findings of an ongoing research project (2005-2008) 
on the transformation of corporate governance regulation in the EU (Germany, 
United Kingdom) and the United States. The project is financed by the German 
Research Association (No. LU 867/1-2). An earlier version was presented at the 
APSA Annual Meeting, August 31-September 3, 2006 in Philadelphia. We are 
indebted to John Cioffi and to the participants of the discussion for helpful 
comments. 
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